This is more than we bargined for.

This is the next artillery evolution piece. The post I wrote previously on this dealt with the French 75mm and its capabilities. This post will detail with how the various powers started to work with the new capabilities.

The biggest and most important thing the French 75 brought to the table of artillery was its ability to shoot accurate indirect fire rapidly. Which is really three items, but they combined into one whole that was so much more than the sum of its parts. With a range of around 7 km, and recoil system that allowed the gun to stay inplace and not have to be re-aimed for every shot and a breechloader that allowed you to shot as fast as you could stuff a new round in, the artillery world was in possession of a weapon it was mentally not ready for. All artillery doctrine to this point had been dealing with only direct fire (i.e. you shoot at what you see), and a vastly slower action time due to having to either a slow reload, or having to reaim the gun. In one swoop, everything holding up artillery rates of fire vanished with the added bonus of such a long range the gun crews could no longer see where the round landed.

This occurred in 1897 in France and within about three years every major power had its own version of the French 75mm with more or less the same capabilities. Where everyone had a chance to be different was in HOW they used these guns. The French had wanted a peice that could use rapid firepower to blast enemy lines into plup which would allow the infantry or cavarly to break through. The British also wanted mobile guns that could keep up with rapid movements and be used to overwhelm forces with firepower (especially for duty in the Empire). Most other powers wanted the same thing initially, but some (the ones with a much more professional outlook) started to think beyond the smaller units (regiments or brigades). Germany was argueably the first major power to realize that with the increased range you could effect the battlefield with artillery without having the guns actually there.

Longer range meant DEPTH. Germany realized that these new guns (and even bigger ones on the drawing board) could be used to influence the battlefield from a distance. Either their own guns could be safely away from the actual bullets (unlike what the British and French were doing) or they could be knocking out targets behind the enemy so that while the initial fight was going good the follow on was already lost (reinforcements, lines of communications, HQs, supplies could be destroyed or delayed via this long range artillery fire).

While this rocked in theory, it led to other issues. How does one control these fires? How can you make sure that your rounds are hitting the right place? How do you adjust the fire, how do you move it if you find out that the target moved, or if a new one shows up? The Germans used a top down plan to control the fires. "Top Down" means that the higher HQs made the plan, controlled the artillery and selected targets to support the ground forces. The problem with this was that for a fluid situation adjustments were hard make on the fly and the Germans discovered that COMMUNICATIONS were now a major issue. Remember, the French 75 came out before radios did.

The French and British did not have a very professional approach to their artillery control. Their focus was on the mobility and firepower aspect. In short, keep the guns close to maneuver forces, when the battle starts you move up to the unit you support and take commands from the guy on the ground. Now this works great on a small scale battle. For the British in the Empire this was a perfect method for fighting (also the French). But the breakdown was when you were NOT fighting in the bush leagues. Battles against another Great Power involve hundreds of thousands of men over huge areas and lasted days. Being subordinated to a infantry brigade meant that you could not easily bring one set of artillery to aid another. No cross-talk, no real higher artillery HQs to coordinate, no method of communicating. Worse, the artillery was often pushed up to the front with the infantry for direct fire use.

Now, some may say "WWI had not happened yet, so how could anyone know any of this?" True, the BIG ONE had not kicked off, but there had been several smaller wars that gave excellent pointers as to how this stuff could work. And everyone had observed them. We had the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkins War. All of these wars involved major powers and the modern weapons and every one of them hinted to the problems the new artillery faced and also its new strengths.

The really interesting thing is that everyone did learn something from these wars. No one was able to put everything together for a perfect setup (that wouldn't happen until 1940 when the US Army finally got everything set up), but the contrast as to how everyone envisioned the use of the new artillery was VERY educational.

The British and French didn't really learn a whole lot. One could argue that the British actually unlearned artillery lessons from the Boer War and tried some ideas that had been proven WRONG during the fight (namely: don't use direct fire on a dug in enemy you can't see). The Germans learned that a centralized fire plan was doable, but you had major issues in adjustments and that you needed LOTS of ammo. The Russians learned they needed better coordination and more modern gear, but they had Czar Nicholas and he was a moron so no fixing got done. The Japanese started with a great artillery plan, focused on indirect fire linked to forward observers. But the Russians were so inept that the Japanese learned that using new artillery in direct fire would work and that they really didn't need to coordinate outside of the immediate unit (that would bit them badly in WWII).

The Americans amazingly learned a huge amount. From the Russo-Japanese War the US determined that Indirect Fire would work, and that it was preferable to direct fire. The US then started a heavy focus on the communication problem (flags, phones and eventually radios) and the idea that if you can communicate with ANY unit, you should be able to support them regardless of what maneuver unit you belong to. Which meant that some type of central HQs would be needed. Where the US really differed was in the fact that they were actively seeking the "happy medium" between the British/French direct support for maneuver (great for the commander on the spot), and the German "Top-Down Plan" (great for the greater whole or overall scheme of maneuver). The US realized it wasn't there yet. Further doctrinal devlopment in the US was hampered by the small size of the US Army and the fact that anything bigger than a Brigade didn't exist so much of what was worked on was pure theory. But they were the only ones thinking that going into WWI.

One thing which everyone did miss (except Bulgaria if you can believe that) was that ammunitions supplies needed to be drastically increased. The Germans realized that some increase was needed, but were still way short going into WWI.

A Truely Great Saying...

From my AOWC readings:

"History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme."

Foamy Cartoon

Folks, if you have not seen the latest Foamy cartoon at http://www.illwillpress.com (titled "Zip Codes") you need to see it NOW.

Guardians of the Public Trust

This is a rant, so if you are not into this sort of thing skip the rest.

Otherwise...

"Guardians of the Public Trust" is a phrase that I have seen several times this week in various bits of reading material. First one was from the Memoirs of US Grant discussing his job as regimental quartermaster in the Pre-Civil War Army and how he was required to account for public property (aka, all US Army equipment his regiment possessed that he was signed for). I have read this same phrase in an Ethics Brief we are required to read ourselves and then brief to our battery leadership, who briefs it on down the line. I used this same phrase when explaining to a West Point Cadet who is training with us over summer break about Reports of Survey/FLIPLs on missing equipment and assigning blame and more importantly liability as to who was going to pay for it or be punished for failing to keep proper accountability of said property.

This phrase is an old one obviously. The US Army (and other uniformed services) have been using this term since prior to the Civil War to explain a fundimental point about the military. We serve the people and Constitution of the US, we are beholden to them, and when we screw up we answer to them. Not just the big media circus shows like Iran-Contra, or f-ups in Vietnam, or not planning Phase Four of Iraqi Freedom. No, we do it every day. Every part, every weapon, every tool, down to the smallest screw, someone is signed for it and is held accountable for it should something go amiss. This week alone my Brigade has had two investigations into missing equipment and I have signed off on a shortage annex (a document that shows that equipment was damaged, worn out or lost due to regular use) for a change of command inventory that involved 6 full days of inspections for every piece of equipment in a battery so the incoming commander knows that when he signs he has every piece he is signing for. And once this is done, he briefs the BDE CO. This is how much detail we go into.

Why? The army's equipment is public property. Not in the sense that every Joe on the street can sign out a tank, but that public monies were made available by the people's representatives (aka Congress) to equip us and that they TRUST us to use it correctly and make every attempt to insure against loss, theft or damage. Every soldier is a guardian in this sense. Even a brand new private who has been in the army less than a week signs for and is then responsible for his personal equipment (helmet, poncho, body armor, etc).

We are able to do this on a regular basis without too much drama.

WHY THE HELL CAN'T WE GET THE EFFING CONGRESS TO DO THE SAME DAMN THING?!?!?!?

Or the President's Finance Wizards or "Czars"(boy, what a great name to use huh?)? Or the FED?!?

The army spends a couple billion over on a new weapon system and we get front page on the NY Times and blasted on how this money could be better used in some social program or to save minnows in Oregon. The government passes a bill that in one swoop spends as much as Bush did for 8 years, and can't account for where it is all going to go, and then forces the Independent Auditors who are supposed to keep this whole thing honest to resign or fires them, and NADA.

WTF!?!?!?!

I am a true Guardian of the Public Trust. Every piece of gear I have ever had I have accounted for or paid for if I damaged or lost it. I am involved with an appeal over a piece of equipment I lost as a BC. But while I am appealing, I am also paying the monthly fine with the understanding that if I do win I get it back. It might take a while to get everything cleared up, but I am not effing around and not paying while I fight it. The law states clearly what I must do and I follow it.

I am trusted to kill for my country, I am trusted to account for millions of dollars of public property for my country. Why can't we get the same out of our government who is responsible for TRILLIONS OF THE PUBLIC'S MONEY?

It can be done, we just need to MAKE THEM do it. Time for forget parties, next time around find the guy who releases his income tax statements and submits to regular audits and is loud about wanting clarity in spending. I will vote for a DEMOCRAT if they can do this (that should give you the idea on how much this is horking me off).

Fourth Of July

Happy Fourth everyone. Late I know, but its the thought that counts. We spent it up in Nebraska with the extended family. Just about everyone seemed to make it for this year which was nice. This was due mostly to everyone who missed the wedding came to meet Tamara and her parents. They also were there and had a great time.

I didn't have much time up there so unfortunately the fireworks was not quite as massive as usual and we didn't fire up the Big Lizard. Also the jeep was in the shop due to a problem with the fuel pump. But that was ok as if either event had been going on I would have had to blow off the reunion and party my parents threw. My parents gave a two hour party for everyone in my home town to come by and meet Tamara and say hi, and then gorge on Root Beer Floats (FYI, you can get Root Beer in a KEG), cake and beer. Everyone had a great time. My In-Laws were a bit thrown off at first because in Ukraine all "parties" that involve "family" are very formal affairs with lots of toasts and hard liquor and sitting down and eating together. This might be the first "American" party they have really been to and once they realized how everything worked ("here's a beer dude, pitch in" is the quote of the weekend, told to my father in law by a guy I knew in High School) they had a great time. The only thing I had a bit of an issue with was that the weather was overcast and just cold enough to make you want to have jeans on, so no swimming or river walking.

Stories for this year are the Saturn Missile Battery that nearly went off in my face (everyone on the beach heard my "OH S#@^" when it tipped over facing me), and the pack of bottle rockets that literally flew in opposite directions from where you aimed. I even managed to avoid any major arguments over politics (although it came close when someone made a comparision of the Iranian militia that crushed the demonstrations to the US National Guard because of Kent State).

Happy Fourth to everyone!

Arrogent Elk

Okay, I am a bit peeved. While driving home tonight I happened to look over to the west side of I44 onto one of Fort Sill's hay fields (for the horses we have, don't ask), and what did I see?

A herd of Elk.

Not just does either. There were at least three bucks, including one that was big enough to put a saddle on. I am not kidding, this guy was HUGE. He had a rack that had to be as wide as my car.

And he was standing there looking at me with that "Yes, I am the most magnificent Elk you will ever see in your life and I know you can't shoot me becuase I'm not in Season" look.

)(&@*&@_!#@%$

I hate arrogent food.

Lost Victories

Since my headers includes books, I felt it time to include one. The Book is "Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brillant General" written by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. This is a memoir of a rather good German Field Marshal whose claim to (Western) fame is the fact that he was one of main developers and pushers of the famous French Campaign in 1940 (through the Ardennes, over the Meuse at Sedan, on to the Channel, BEF escapes at Dunkrik). While he was pretty good on that one, his Eastern Front exploits put that to shame. But since they were against Russians/Soviets, they are not so well known to most Americans.

Well, Germany lost the war so you guys know how the ending goes. Manstein requested to be relieved of his command in early 1944 and refused to come back later so he really did sit out the last part. He survived Hitler's nuttiness and was captured when Germany was plowed under in 1945.

Since I haven't written a book review before forgive the rambling.

Okay, the book. This book is NOT for the casual war nut. I am not even sure its for a serious war nut. Manstein is proof that just because you are a brillant man in another field, that does not automatically translate into the ability to write well. Compared to Guiderian or Rommel this book is a TOUGH read. Both had a much better writing style that moved on quickly and still gave you some good data. Manstein's book is a serious look at high level warfare and how it works (or not). I am talking strategy and operational levels. Most of this book deals with Army Level Command or higher, and that doesn't make much "fun" reading. This book requires you to work at it and think about what exactly is going on. Not something a causal reader looking for a good "war book" is going to get into. It helps to have a good background about what is happening, and you better be able to figure out a map becuase you will be referring to one a LOT. When you have several Army Groups worth of space (on the EASTERN FRONT mind you), you are talking hundreds of miles of operations.

Now, if you do dare this book it gives some seriously good insights into how Hitler's mind works. Manstein had some seriously interesting comments on this. Some were pretty standard, but he hit on some that make perfect sense but hadn't occurred to me. Such as Hitler's total inability to think long term operationally or strategically (the furthest out Manstein could get him to really think was maybe 2 weeks, tactically ok, but an absolute distaster if you are trying to think operationally, and words are not in existance to describe how bad this is strategically). He also helped to flesh out some more well known "Hitlerisms" such as "no retreating allowed". He had some serious great input as to how the SS and Luffwaffe Field Divisions seriously boned the regular military in terms of replacements and this was made worse by the fact that the new full strength divisions usually had no vets and so got torn up in combat until they learned. I had never thought about that angle other than the old units were short men, but he was absolutely right.

Overall, this book is a work for a scholar to read. If you are one, hit it. If not, I would recommend Guiderian to start. I am thinking this is proof of the B.H. Liddell Hart Rule: If Hart wrote the foreword, its a thinker's book.

(Hart was one of the first theorists of mechanized warfare in history. He was in the British Army, but due to some of the quirks that accompany the "first great thinkers" in any occupation, he never became famous outside of historian circles).