Monday, September 28, 2009

Suspected flag burner pilloried -- Page 1 -- Times Union - Albany NY:1884:

Suspected flag burner pilloried -- Page 1 -- Times Union - Albany NY:1884:

I am testing the link thing. It looks like it will work so if not, hit the old Bing.com for searching (I am trying not to use Google anymore).

I just LOVE this article. It would be so much better if this happened to a anti-war protestor instead of someone who was kicked out of the VFW bar for failing to produce an ID to buy a drink, but its still great.

Simple point here, your right to protest is equally matched by others rights. If your protest involved messing with their property or something they REALLY care about, you could rapidly end up in world of hurt (as in being given the chance to have your butt whipped by a war vet which was choice B in this incident).

I have to think this is why you never see anarchists targeting the American Legion Convention to stick it to the man, or ALF trying to attack a biker rally over the leather jackets. Even the truely dense understand that there are things you don't do and places you don't go when protesting. This truth spans the spectrum of right to left (you never see KKK at a Black Panther rally, or PETA in Deep woods West Virginia on the opening day of hunting season).

Saturday, September 26, 2009

Initial Lessons Learned

This is the next bit on artillery evolution in WWI.

In my last post I discussed the initial doctrines of the various world powers going into WWI. 1914 saw the only true bit of maneuver warfare on the Western Front until late 1918. For the rest of this time, it was "static" or "trench" warfare. It was in this arena that the concepts of true modern artillery came to be as the various grey areas that had been discovered were eliminated through often painful real world experience. We are going to talk about the Central Powers first (aka Germany).

For the Germans, the major breakthroughs were actually not many. Their concepts of centralized fire planning (that is artilley planning) were actually very much ahead of the allies and given the large battles being fought (we are talking whole armies worth here numbering in the hundreds of thousands), this was actually very successful. Being able to control and mass your artillery to support the decisive effort (the main push if you will) was often key in the German victories. It also greatly helped the Germans that they were on the defensive on the Western Front until the spring of 1918. In defending, the Germans were able to avoid the communications issues that still plagued the offensive (they had dug in phone lines).

Where the Germans did make advances were in Chemical Warfare. The Germans were the first to use Poison Gas, and rapidly discovered that artillery shells were much more effective in dispersing it. Just releasing gas from a cannister only made a cloud that could blow back on you or dissipate rapidly. But with artillery shells you could keep pumping gas into the cloud, put the chemicals were you wanted them and you could put them FAR to the rear of the enemy. The biggest military benefit of Chemical weapons isn't actually their killing power, its their staying power. Soldiers can function in protective gear in a chemical environment, but everything takes longer and you tire quicker. But the Gas is persistant, even stuff like Chlorine gas can linger for over 24 hours in certain places. When confronted with this, often time military units will just place the area off limits or go around it. This great for area denial, or for helping cover your flanks or rapidly plug gaps. Or for contaiminating a logistical node or railhead. Even 12 hours can be critical if the area off limits is a key road intersection for instance.

In utilizing gas, the Germans discovered the weather played a huge roll in how this weapon was used. Not only in how the chemicals were effected, but in how accurate their deep artillery fire was. Meteological data (or MET as we call it) has a major impact on how artillery shells fly through the air and even how the shells react (i.e. go boom or not). First there is the wind, which the Germans (and also the allies) discovered can be at different directions at different altitudes. This can throw a shell off by hundreds of meters at long distances (such as in a deep chemical strike). There is temperature. This can also effect the shell's trajectory, but it can also effect the mechanics of the shell. Certain mechanical timers would freeze or become brittle in cold weather which would make a dud or might set the shell off early (bad that). Certain shell loads could melt or freeze which would effect the shell's rotation and cause it to literally spin off course (this mostly happened in White Phosphorous Rounds, but also chemical rounds). And of course the weather in general would effect how well the chemicals would work. Rain would wash away most persistant agents, but cold, snow and even sun effected them. Rain could even set off shells early if the fuze (set for point impact) hit a raindrop when flying through the air.

The Germans discovered that by gathering accurate MET data, they could adjust the artillery computations using mathmatical formulas in computing firing data. Through some trial and error, they learned certain methods of storing ammunition that would cut down on weather effects (such as covering ammo when it rained, keeping it off the ground, not stacking it but placing it on its base). They also fixed the mechanical problems for most fuzes (although the rain drop one was only fixed in 1986).

In fixing these issues the Germans refined their methods of Map Firing. Map Firing is basically shooting blind without someone observing where your artillery actually landed. The Germans had figured out by late 1915 that with a accurate map and accurate data, you could do this successfully (more or less, we are not talking 1 shot with a Tomohawk missile, we are talking 500 guns taking out a square mile or two). Since they were standing on the defensive, they could survey in all their controlled territory, and zero their targets. This was one of the main reasons why the Western Front was so bloody, the Germans were often times shooting fish in a barrel.

The other major area of German Artillery development was in heavy artillery. While the Allies were focused on the lighter, more mobile stuff. The Germans focused on the BIG guns. The Germans had more heavy artillery per division than any Allied division, and they had corps and army level artillery commands to use it properly. Krupp (those lovable German arms makers) specialized in heavy guns. 6 and 8 inch guns and howitzers were the norm in the German Army of WWI. Please note I said howitzers. Unlike the Allies, the Germans liked using howitzers because of the range and ability to hit entrenched troops. The Germans quickly learned something with their heavy guns and that was DEPTH. The German battle plans throughout the war (and this includes the early years) always had artillery hitting the enemy key areas as far back as they could. While the Allies intially had a very short view of the battlefield, the Germans realized that with long range weapons you could hit things behind the lines that would effect the actual battle. This was one of the driving forces to get Chemical Weapons modified for artillery use. The Germans were really the first group to get a truely 2 dimensional view of the battlefield (length AND depth). And this led to the REALLY big guns.

I am going to stop here as the really heavy artillery I am going to cover separately (the Big Berthas and so on). Next time we will hit the Allies (no pun intended).

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

And its a...

GIRL!

Tamara and I will be having a baby girl in early February. We just had the ultrasound today and found out. Tamara is 4 and 1/2 months along and the baby is doing great (mother also). The baby was also doing some rather severe physical activity because it took us 30 minutes to get her to stop moving long enough to get all the ultrasound data. She is into crunches apparently.

Sunday, September 13, 2009

Into the Wilderness

After a bit of hiatus, I am going to continue with my artillery historic posts. I am picking up with the start of WWI.

August 1914 saw the start of the First World War. Artillery-wise every major combatant (even the US) was equipped with roughly the same types of artillery. Recoilless, long ranged (as in over 6 kms), rapid firing, and using self-contained ammo (i.e. you put in one shell at a time and fire away instead of loading powder, then shell, then primer). Everyone was WAY short on ammo stocks (everyone was thinking a short war). Where the difference lay was doctrine and number of gun types.

The Allies (Britian, France, Russia and a host of smaller nations) had a focus on lighter, more "mobile" rapid firing guns. Heavy guns and howitzers existed, but were much rarer. The British actually had to use dismounted naval guns for heavy artillery (4.7 inch and 6 inch) due to the shortage. The basic tactical doctrine for the allies was to splice out your artillery to maneuver units (usually the regiment or a brigade) and have them provide on the spot artillery in support of the tactical maneuver unit. Great for small unit warfare, bad when its not just small units. Where this system had problems was when you attempted to mass your fires of several artillery units on one target. Without a higher artillery headquarters or a doctrine for controlling hundreds of guns (and we do mean hundreds) you had major issues of command and control, and it was an absolute mess getting the guns to obey you instead of the local commander.

The Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) were pretty much the exact opposite. Centralized control and massed fires were their method and it was pretty damn effective too. The German General Staff was arguably the only military group who had actually been working on war plans that focused on whole armies instead of smaller units. They were very much "Big Picture" guys and their fire doctrine reflected it. An operations order would contain very detailed instructions on how to use your artillery and it was massed to provide the maximum amount of fire support for the key operations and the decisive (or main) effort. Instead of everyone getting some fire support, the most important effort got everything and then some. This worked great but its weak spot was in being able to adjust when things went wrong. If some defensive points were missed, it was incredibly hard to get fire support to take them out if it was not in the plan. Since a couple of machine guns could hold up entire regiments, this was not a minor problem.

Both sides had one shared major issue: communications. Fires could be adjusted, new targets plotted and changes made IF YOU COULD TALK. But this was very hard in an era of no radio and unreliable telephones. Once battles started, unless you could keep up with messengers (not bloody likely), pigeons (yep, they were used), flags, or phone, you were gong off the plan. If you were allied you couldn't help nearby units in trouble and if you were central you couldn't get help to knock out a missed machine gun nest.

So how did everyone do and how did they adjust?

That will be in the next article.

Thursday, September 10, 2009

XM-326 Dragon Fire II

New toy for us artillery types in the works. Called the XM-326 Dragon Fire II (I can't get a picture to download right now, sorry), this is the rather belated arrival of wheeled self propelled artillery. And technically its not really artillery but an improved rifled 120mm heavy mortar.

The brain-child of the USMC, this baby has a range of 8.2 Kms (an increase of 1 Km over current 120mms) and is mounted on a wheeled 6400 mil capable baseplate. You can tow it OR you can mount it in a modified LAV (the eight wheeled armored car the stryker is based on) for a SP gun. This thing is semi-auto, so its rate of fire is pretty good (sorry, no unclassified numbers for this). Its a heavy mortar, but its loaded by prepackaged shells so no "hanging" of mortar rounds (quick item, the USMC considers heavy mortars to be "artillery" versus the lighter mortars (81mm and less) that are "Infantry" weapons).

And the most cool aspect of this baby is that it is able to shoot while on the move (you have to slow down some though). That right there brings down the artillery house if they can make it continually work without issue. Right now this baby is in experimental stages, but prototypes are already existing and the USMC (and the Strykers in the Army) are VERY interested. For the Army, this would be a near perfect SP weapon for the medium/stryker BCTs in existance. And I would be happy that the US Military has finally figured out you can actuall have wheeled SP artillery (which the Czechs proved in 1990, but we didn't buy into).

Saturday, September 5, 2009

This is why Mercenaries Suck

I am going to assume that everyone has heard about our "contract security" and the "situation" they have with them in Afghanistan. If not, short and sweet was that a group of hired contract security guards who were supposed to be protecting the US Embassy and other US State Department building/compound in Afghanistan are now being investigated for having drunken orgies complete with naked dancing, hookers and lots of booze (in a supposidly Muslim country too I might add). Several guards have told investigators that they were hazed, forced to perform sex acts for their bosses for good shifts and that the multination force couldn't even talk to each other due to language differences. Which was really great since the guys that they couldn't talk to were Gurkas and arguably the most effective guards they had.

I am a professional soldier, and I don't have much use for mercs. Historically speaking, mercs (usually) are not effective fighters or soldiers. Yes, there are exceptions, but not many. Usually the biggest issues with them are discipline related, and if the chain of command for them is hazy, they rapidly can go out of control. The 30 Years War in Europe is a great example of how out of control mercenary forces can get. Other most recent examples of stupid merc tricks are Abu Gurabi (contract interrogations without supervision which spilled over to a regular unit), Blackwater (take your pick, but the famous ones are the shootout in Baghdad which killed a lot of civilians, the heliocopter getting shot down becuase they were in a hurry, or lots of other smaller incidents, some of which I saw firsthand), and Triple Canopy (had the initial contract to protect US diplomats in Iraq and got fired after one year). This one, however takes the cake.

Simply put, the mercs don't fall under a military chain of command so the military cannot hold them accountable if they jack up. And the civilians they work for frequently don't want to really dig down as this stuff is something they don't understand or don't want to be bothered with. So the mercs can get a pass for doing some outragous stuff. And this makes the problem worse by who it attracts.

I have dealt with mercs in Iraq. The high pay and rather loose discipline attract a bad crowd. Frequently, the guys I talked to were prior military, with over five years in but usually less than 15 years in. This is important because it indicates something. A military retirement is 20 years service, and a initial hitch is usually 4 or 5 years. Most mercs were over 10 years in, so why not go all the way for retirement? Because they wouldn't have made it. Usually discipline problems. I heard a lot of "the army was just jacked up and wouldn't let me do my thing, or do what would have worked, or let us really get tough". Translation: I couldn't follow the ROE and other orders, I was trigger happy and I had trouble with authority. So, ex military with discipline problems? Why not join a high paying group that shoots first and rarely asks questions?

The State Department requently has issues with the Defense Department. I can understand that, but for crying out loud we can follow orders and have discipline. I can't say this mistrust is why State is hiring so many mercs to protect them. I know that State is short security personnel because of the various wars we are in so that is probably a more realistic reason. But this is what you get when you really don't want to be bothered with "details" on security because its something you don't get or think is beneath you. But how are they going to punish these guys? If the army did this, how many coals would we be raked over? But what about these clowns? What can they do aside from fire them? Can they be brought to court? Can they be sued? Can they be punished in any way? THe contract can get jerked, another one awarded and you know what? They will probably hire the same boneheads to do the same thing.

This should be a scandel equal to Abu Garabi, these are STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES having ORGIES! But since they are mercs (and a couple of other political reasons I will not go into) they fall into a nice grey area. So now, the US Army is having to provide guards to guard the guards while this is "looked into".

This alone should be the biggest argument for a professional military you would ever need.

Wednesday, September 2, 2009

A Clue for the Masses

This is a mix of rant and FYI for various folks out there. Before ranting or rambling on about what books we should be studying for Afghanistan, or that our "Strategic Focus" is off, do myself and other professional military types the favor of at least reading the definitions of what tactical/tactics, operational and strategic mean.

I recently read a WSJ article on how Afghanistan was headed in the wrong direction and that we were following the wrong "Strategy" for winning the war. Now, there is some truth to that saying and certainly we can improve on many things (you always can, no one ever jumps into war and it goes 100% perfect and exactly to plan, not even the Nazi War machine which usually gets tossed up as an example). Where I had the issue is the following paragraph which the author gave a list of books that many officers were reading and studying to prep for action over there. Books like "The Bear Went Over The Mountain" which is a translated copy of the Red Army's AARs for over a hundred small unit actions ranging from squad to battalion size. The reviewed the actions and commented on improvements that could have been made within the Soviet Doctrinal framework. Then the translator added some more based on what the US would have done using ours. Numerous highly useful TACTICAL lessons can be gained from this book. The article author made a huge stink about how this book was merely showing the US "failed" (and most of the actions were not exactly shining examples of how to do it right certainly) ideas and that this was totally undermining the strategy and teaching our officers bad ideas.

This shows an incredible lack of simple understanding of terminology. This book (which I use to train my Junior Officers on in weekly OPDs) is a TACTICAL book. It isn't supposed to be about STRATEGIC level thinking or even operational. It does make some tie ins for certain items along the lines of "The US wouldn't do this as the press would crucify us and its a war crime", but that isn't the point of the book. Its about small unit tactics that junior officers and NCOs might use if they are ever deployed to Afghanistan, and mostly about what NOT to do (I am not kidding, you read this book and any idea of the Red Army being a major military power is going to take a severe hit).

Junior Officers are supposed to have some understanding of strategic aims and operational aims, but their focus is the close in fight. Commanding platoons, doing maintenance, training and so on. The books that this writer was hammering were excellent sources for THIS LEVEL. They were not aimed at strategic levels or operational levels. But this civilian (brutally obvious if you know what you are reading) had his levels and terms mixed up. I agreed with some of his points, but he really needed to work on his understanding of the different levels of warfare. The books he cut down are excellent sources of information that are very useful to draw on at the TACTICAL level.

Apples to apples, not apples to pears or peaches (or guavas).