HAPPY VETERAN'S DAY!
The 11th Hour of the 11th Day of the 11th Month.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Japanese Addendum
This is an add on to the other post. Japan was the other country on the Allied side that had some input into the artillery fight in WWI, but not in the way you might think.
The Imperial Japanese Army had fought the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th Century. Despite the fact that they had older weapons than the Russians, the Japanese were actually one of the first countries to develop the concept of Indirect Fire. This is the idea of having your guns/howitzers firing from far enough away that you cannot see the target from the gun. Observers must be used to successfully determine if you are hitting the target and to make adjustments as needed. The Japanese didn't use range so much as they used terrain. They would position guns behind hills, folds of ground, in forests, anything that concealed the guns from the Russians seeing them. Often the guns were very close to the fight. But the Japanese used their Battery Commanders to go forward with phone/telegraphs and flags to signal back to the guns adjustments needed. The Japanese were able to maximize their guns and beat the Russian Army in artillery in just about every battle.
Now, this had two impacts. One was that the Japanese got a very poor opinion of European artillery. Even when the Japanese used guns in direct fire mode, the Russians were often unable to knock them out. The Japanese started using their guns in more direct fire modes as they could greatly assist the infantry against dug in Russian positions. In WWI, the Japanese fought limited actions against small German forces in China, and again were able to use guns in direct fire mode without issue (the Germans had very small forces and couldn't stand up to the Japanese attacks). Then when fighting the Chinese in the 1920's and 1930's the Japanese again had zero counterfire threat and pretty much moved to close in support of the infantry via having the guns close in. They never developed the concepts of massing guns or centralized control due to their experience.
The other impact: one country was highly impressed by the Japanese ability to use indirect fire effectively and going into WWI had this as their key concept for artillery deployment. This country would build on it and combine it with the centralized fire concepts of the French.
That would be the US Army.
The Imperial Japanese Army had fought the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th Century. Despite the fact that they had older weapons than the Russians, the Japanese were actually one of the first countries to develop the concept of Indirect Fire. This is the idea of having your guns/howitzers firing from far enough away that you cannot see the target from the gun. Observers must be used to successfully determine if you are hitting the target and to make adjustments as needed. The Japanese didn't use range so much as they used terrain. They would position guns behind hills, folds of ground, in forests, anything that concealed the guns from the Russians seeing them. Often the guns were very close to the fight. But the Japanese used their Battery Commanders to go forward with phone/telegraphs and flags to signal back to the guns adjustments needed. The Japanese were able to maximize their guns and beat the Russian Army in artillery in just about every battle.
Now, this had two impacts. One was that the Japanese got a very poor opinion of European artillery. Even when the Japanese used guns in direct fire mode, the Russians were often unable to knock them out. The Japanese started using their guns in more direct fire modes as they could greatly assist the infantry against dug in Russian positions. In WWI, the Japanese fought limited actions against small German forces in China, and again were able to use guns in direct fire mode without issue (the Germans had very small forces and couldn't stand up to the Japanese attacks). Then when fighting the Chinese in the 1920's and 1930's the Japanese again had zero counterfire threat and pretty much moved to close in support of the infantry via having the guns close in. They never developed the concepts of massing guns or centralized control due to their experience.
The other impact: one country was highly impressed by the Japanese ability to use indirect fire effectively and going into WWI had this as their key concept for artillery deployment. This country would build on it and combine it with the centralized fire concepts of the French.
That would be the US Army.
Saturday, November 7, 2009
The Allies
Greetings all, this is the next part on my little series on artillery evolution. This focuses on the Allied Forces. We are mostly discussing the British and French, with a bit of Japanese. No Russians (they really didn't add much for this war in anything, but learned a lot), and not really anything from the US (I'll hit the Yanks later for a special reason).
The Allied forces were mobility focused in their artillery concepts. Lighter guns, rapid firing, able to keep up with the maneuver forces. When you hit the enemy you smother him with firepower allowing your infantry (sometimes cavalry) to then rapidly overwhelm him. This concept had developed from two main experiences. For the French it was the concepts of Napoleon and the experiences of the Franco-Prussian War. Maneuver was the key to victory, massed firepower allowed you to break through and keep moving. So the guns had to keep up, and you had to use them to provide DIRECT support to the infantry. If you study Napoleon, you see his use of artillery in mass as key in many of his fights. For the British, the concept was similar. Mobile guns, direct support. This concept came from the "Small Wars of Empire" that they had been fighting for decades. Artillery slaughtered the natives in direct usage because they had nothing to hit back with.
As the saying goes "Works in Theory"...
The sad part of this whole concept is that both the French and British had some very close examples of why this theory was no longer the case and that they were dangerously behind in artillery theory, if not actual equipment (their guns were actually quite good). For the French, the reorganizations that followed the Franco-Prussian War were not actually very good in certain areas. The big point the French completely missed was that their new rapid firing guns still needed to be massed for maximum effectiveness. The French created a huge army with a reserve system, but they did not create an integrated method to fight it. Once you got down to it, the French were fighting battles like they were hundreds of little regiment on regiment fights with almost zero coordination. You could have three units within a few miles of each other and would be in a practical vacuum, unable (or unwilling) to help the flank unit. Now, the communications problems still existed for everyone (no radio, phones were crude) but the Germans continually worked on these issues so they had an understanding of what they faced. Not so much the French. The really bad part for the French was that because of poor coordination, their wonderful artillery was parcelled out and unable to mass to support the key operation. There were some seriously bad strategic thinking going on too but that goes beyond what I am looking at.
The British were in the same situation. No centralized fire control for artillery, and an absolute archaic theory on its use (drive it to the sound of firing, roll up to the front of the lines, and start shooting direct fire and whatever moves). Worse, the British had very recent experience with the Boer War against people who were as well equipped as them (the Boers had Krupp artillery, Mauser Rifles and Machine Guns) and had seen what that theory got them (lots of dead artillerymen and lost guns).
Both the British and French lacked in heavy artillery and had no concepts about using deep fires to disrupt enemy forces beyond the front lines.
But as learning curves go, the British and French actually outpaced the Germans in this case. They started farther back in theory, weapons and development and they pulled even and even ahead by the wars end.
First, the Allies rapidly learned that the concept of firepower usage had changed. Simply rolling up the guns and blasting the nearest front line no longer worked. Even rapid breechloading guns could not win the firepower war against hidden machine guns in a direct firefight. So they rapidly learned that the new long ranges had to be used to make the guns survivable and effective. More guns were needed to hit an area, even with 15 rounds a minute a battery could not effectively support a regimental attack. So habitual relationships (battery to a infantry regiment) were broken up and artillery centralized control was set up to mass and control the growing numbers of guns needed.
With the creation of Central Fire Control for the Allies, the next big developments were in observed and unobserved firing. With newer phones, the Allies set up OP (Observation Posts) that could spot artillery and adjust the rounds on to target. Ground units alone could not see everything so the airplane (equipped with new wireless radio) and the balloon were used to spot artillery (this led to more air to air combat as each side was trying to shoot down the other sides observers, but that is another story). The Allies got to be very good at this as the Germans stood on the defensive for 3 years and had dug in on the best defensive terrain (highest ground).
As this was going on the Allies started bringing in heavier guns. The French had the 155mm howitzers and the British had the 4.7 in and 6 in guns and howitzers. These heavier guns led the Allies to discover the concepts of depth in the battlefield. These guns could hit the German rear areas and disrupt transportation and the movement of reserves. But often this was in areas they could not see or get observation planes over. Which led to the development of Map Firing.
Map Firing was simply the process of hitting a target using a map only. Sounds simple but it is actually VERY complicated. The Germans never quite got it, but the Allies did after much trial and error. First, the Allies fixed surveying problems and designed new mapping methods that finally created maps with modern levels of accuracy. In doing this, they discovered the issues involved with making a square map work when you are dealing with a round area (the world is round remember?). Azimuth adjustments, curvature of the earth, height of sea level (for both the target and the guns), actual versus magnetic north. And once these were fixed the Allies then discovered how weather effected long range firing (wind direction, air temperature, the possiblity of different wind directions at different altitudes). The Germans also did some work on this, but the Allies were the ones that really ran with it. The Germans focused this on their heavy guns, the Allies realized that this effected ALL artillery and used it as such.
The final problem that the Allies (as well as the Germans) ran into was the tying in. Making your artillery hit where and when it had to sounds simple enough, but how do you do that without a radio? ONce the infantry moved out, they were almost immediately out of contact with higher HQs. There were no man portable radios, runners were slow and had a bad habit of dying, wire got cut or shorted out or ran out, and pigeons often times got lost. So what happens if you are 10 minutes late to a location and the artillery fire has stopped firing suppression? You get mowed down by unsurpressed MG fire. Various Tactics were developed to deal with this. The "Creeping Barrage" was an Allied invention that more or less worked, but still had issues. A Wall of Artillery fire moves forward at so many meters per minute, the infantry walks behind it and in theory arrives at the target just after the FA fire lifts. But what happens if you get delayed (happened a lot), or you missed something like a concrete bunker that wasn't knocked out? You fall behind and your artillery fire outruns you. And you get mowed down. This problem was never quite solved in WWI by either side.
The Allies ended up with a huge learning leap in WWI in terms of artillery. Becuase of this the artillery became the key component of the War for them, the French Army went from being insanely gung ho to incredibly methodical (which bites them in WWII). The British were much slower learners and it wasn't until 1917 that they really started getting the ideas down. And this was actually lost lessons in many cases due to some rather stupid attacks in 1917.
Next time we start talking about the end of WWI and what everyone started taking away from it for the next round.
The Allied forces were mobility focused in their artillery concepts. Lighter guns, rapid firing, able to keep up with the maneuver forces. When you hit the enemy you smother him with firepower allowing your infantry (sometimes cavalry) to then rapidly overwhelm him. This concept had developed from two main experiences. For the French it was the concepts of Napoleon and the experiences of the Franco-Prussian War. Maneuver was the key to victory, massed firepower allowed you to break through and keep moving. So the guns had to keep up, and you had to use them to provide DIRECT support to the infantry. If you study Napoleon, you see his use of artillery in mass as key in many of his fights. For the British, the concept was similar. Mobile guns, direct support. This concept came from the "Small Wars of Empire" that they had been fighting for decades. Artillery slaughtered the natives in direct usage because they had nothing to hit back with.
As the saying goes "Works in Theory"...
The sad part of this whole concept is that both the French and British had some very close examples of why this theory was no longer the case and that they were dangerously behind in artillery theory, if not actual equipment (their guns were actually quite good). For the French, the reorganizations that followed the Franco-Prussian War were not actually very good in certain areas. The big point the French completely missed was that their new rapid firing guns still needed to be massed for maximum effectiveness. The French created a huge army with a reserve system, but they did not create an integrated method to fight it. Once you got down to it, the French were fighting battles like they were hundreds of little regiment on regiment fights with almost zero coordination. You could have three units within a few miles of each other and would be in a practical vacuum, unable (or unwilling) to help the flank unit. Now, the communications problems still existed for everyone (no radio, phones were crude) but the Germans continually worked on these issues so they had an understanding of what they faced. Not so much the French. The really bad part for the French was that because of poor coordination, their wonderful artillery was parcelled out and unable to mass to support the key operation. There were some seriously bad strategic thinking going on too but that goes beyond what I am looking at.
The British were in the same situation. No centralized fire control for artillery, and an absolute archaic theory on its use (drive it to the sound of firing, roll up to the front of the lines, and start shooting direct fire and whatever moves). Worse, the British had very recent experience with the Boer War against people who were as well equipped as them (the Boers had Krupp artillery, Mauser Rifles and Machine Guns) and had seen what that theory got them (lots of dead artillerymen and lost guns).
Both the British and French lacked in heavy artillery and had no concepts about using deep fires to disrupt enemy forces beyond the front lines.
But as learning curves go, the British and French actually outpaced the Germans in this case. They started farther back in theory, weapons and development and they pulled even and even ahead by the wars end.
First, the Allies rapidly learned that the concept of firepower usage had changed. Simply rolling up the guns and blasting the nearest front line no longer worked. Even rapid breechloading guns could not win the firepower war against hidden machine guns in a direct firefight. So they rapidly learned that the new long ranges had to be used to make the guns survivable and effective. More guns were needed to hit an area, even with 15 rounds a minute a battery could not effectively support a regimental attack. So habitual relationships (battery to a infantry regiment) were broken up and artillery centralized control was set up to mass and control the growing numbers of guns needed.
With the creation of Central Fire Control for the Allies, the next big developments were in observed and unobserved firing. With newer phones, the Allies set up OP (Observation Posts) that could spot artillery and adjust the rounds on to target. Ground units alone could not see everything so the airplane (equipped with new wireless radio) and the balloon were used to spot artillery (this led to more air to air combat as each side was trying to shoot down the other sides observers, but that is another story). The Allies got to be very good at this as the Germans stood on the defensive for 3 years and had dug in on the best defensive terrain (highest ground).
As this was going on the Allies started bringing in heavier guns. The French had the 155mm howitzers and the British had the 4.7 in and 6 in guns and howitzers. These heavier guns led the Allies to discover the concepts of depth in the battlefield. These guns could hit the German rear areas and disrupt transportation and the movement of reserves. But often this was in areas they could not see or get observation planes over. Which led to the development of Map Firing.
Map Firing was simply the process of hitting a target using a map only. Sounds simple but it is actually VERY complicated. The Germans never quite got it, but the Allies did after much trial and error. First, the Allies fixed surveying problems and designed new mapping methods that finally created maps with modern levels of accuracy. In doing this, they discovered the issues involved with making a square map work when you are dealing with a round area (the world is round remember?). Azimuth adjustments, curvature of the earth, height of sea level (for both the target and the guns), actual versus magnetic north. And once these were fixed the Allies then discovered how weather effected long range firing (wind direction, air temperature, the possiblity of different wind directions at different altitudes). The Germans also did some work on this, but the Allies were the ones that really ran with it. The Germans focused this on their heavy guns, the Allies realized that this effected ALL artillery and used it as such.
The final problem that the Allies (as well as the Germans) ran into was the tying in. Making your artillery hit where and when it had to sounds simple enough, but how do you do that without a radio? ONce the infantry moved out, they were almost immediately out of contact with higher HQs. There were no man portable radios, runners were slow and had a bad habit of dying, wire got cut or shorted out or ran out, and pigeons often times got lost. So what happens if you are 10 minutes late to a location and the artillery fire has stopped firing suppression? You get mowed down by unsurpressed MG fire. Various Tactics were developed to deal with this. The "Creeping Barrage" was an Allied invention that more or less worked, but still had issues. A Wall of Artillery fire moves forward at so many meters per minute, the infantry walks behind it and in theory arrives at the target just after the FA fire lifts. But what happens if you get delayed (happened a lot), or you missed something like a concrete bunker that wasn't knocked out? You fall behind and your artillery fire outruns you. And you get mowed down. This problem was never quite solved in WWI by either side.
The Allies ended up with a huge learning leap in WWI in terms of artillery. Becuase of this the artillery became the key component of the War for them, the French Army went from being insanely gung ho to incredibly methodical (which bites them in WWII). The British were much slower learners and it wasn't until 1917 that they really started getting the ideas down. And this was actually lost lessons in many cases due to some rather stupid attacks in 1917.
Next time we start talking about the end of WWI and what everyone started taking away from it for the next round.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
Education
This last week we bid goodbye to 4 "Snowbird" Lieutenants. A Snowbird is a soldier (officer, enlisted or NCO) who has to wait at some location for several months (usually not more than 4) until their next assignment is ready for them. We had four LTs who had been comissioned but their OBC date was not until November. So we got to use them for about 3 months.
We were glad to have them as we are usually short on officers, and they did a great job for the short time they were here. The one thing I very much enjoyed was our OPD (Officer Professional Development) sessions. We had (and still do) have one a week when we do a short battle analysis. The idea is to see what we can learn from a certain battle so that we don't repeat the problem later on. The books I used are "The Bear Went Over The Mountian" and "The Other Side Of The Mountain", both about the Soviet/Afghan War in the 1980's. We focused on the Soviet side and I tried to zero in on things that we are doing now over there (Convoys, raids, ambushes, etc.). The concept is to figure out what both sides did right and wrong, and what would we do as Americans (our TTPs are different so many times our solutions to the same problem are different).
We all learned a lot. I can tell you this much: my estimation of the Soviet Military machine dropped considerably after this study. I knew that the Soviets didn't have much focus on NCOs, but our studies brought home the difference in a huge way (example: for a squad sized ambush would YOU put a MAJOR in charge? In the US, that is the job of a corporal or a buck sergeant, but they Soviets used Majors and even higher several times). But this was all lead up.
Our Capstone study was an analysis of the Battle of Wanat. This was a US action fought last year, 8 US troops died and over 20 were wounded. A COP (Combat Patrol Base) was almost overrun by Taliban. We held them off, and inflicted heavy losses. But the point was I wanted my LTs to see that many simple lessons we thought were absolute in the US Army were not so absolute. I told them this was the "hard look in the mirror" and to not slant their views because these were US troops involved. It was not a pleasant discussion, especially considering these guys were also paratroops and part of a unit considered to be elite by many in the US. But it was a great learning experience. It really hammered home to the LTs that the military is a profession, and in professions you must study and apply what you learn. Lots of folks miss the difference, but I think I have got the point across.
Now we are going to study the Afghan side. Should also be useful.
We were glad to have them as we are usually short on officers, and they did a great job for the short time they were here. The one thing I very much enjoyed was our OPD (Officer Professional Development) sessions. We had (and still do) have one a week when we do a short battle analysis. The idea is to see what we can learn from a certain battle so that we don't repeat the problem later on. The books I used are "The Bear Went Over The Mountian" and "The Other Side Of The Mountain", both about the Soviet/Afghan War in the 1980's. We focused on the Soviet side and I tried to zero in on things that we are doing now over there (Convoys, raids, ambushes, etc.). The concept is to figure out what both sides did right and wrong, and what would we do as Americans (our TTPs are different so many times our solutions to the same problem are different).
We all learned a lot. I can tell you this much: my estimation of the Soviet Military machine dropped considerably after this study. I knew that the Soviets didn't have much focus on NCOs, but our studies brought home the difference in a huge way (example: for a squad sized ambush would YOU put a MAJOR in charge? In the US, that is the job of a corporal or a buck sergeant, but they Soviets used Majors and even higher several times). But this was all lead up.
Our Capstone study was an analysis of the Battle of Wanat. This was a US action fought last year, 8 US troops died and over 20 were wounded. A COP (Combat Patrol Base) was almost overrun by Taliban. We held them off, and inflicted heavy losses. But the point was I wanted my LTs to see that many simple lessons we thought were absolute in the US Army were not so absolute. I told them this was the "hard look in the mirror" and to not slant their views because these were US troops involved. It was not a pleasant discussion, especially considering these guys were also paratroops and part of a unit considered to be elite by many in the US. But it was a great learning experience. It really hammered home to the LTs that the military is a profession, and in professions you must study and apply what you learn. Lots of folks miss the difference, but I think I have got the point across.
Now we are going to study the Afghan side. Should also be useful.
Saturday, October 24, 2009
God, We SUCK
I just got back from the UNL/Iowa State Game. I have rarely said bad things about Nebraska Football, but I have to say it now:
WE SUCK.
VMI could have done better than what I saw today. Our Defense is pretty solid, but our Offense is non-existant. 7 Turnovers, 4 of which were within 10 yards of the goal line. UNL has imploded, and it sucks.
WE SUCK.
VMI could have done better than what I saw today. Our Defense is pretty solid, but our Offense is non-existant. 7 Turnovers, 4 of which were within 10 yards of the goal line. UNL has imploded, and it sucks.
Thursday, October 22, 2009
A Moment of Silence
My Laptop appears to be DEAD. This is being typed on my wife's new Toshiba. I have just about everything saved on my portable harddrive (thank god). But its a sad day, it was a vet of the Iraq war like me...
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Grant's Memoirs
I finished read Grant's Memoirs about two weeks ago and forgot to put out the review. So better late than never.
This is the biography of US Grant, aka LT General Ulyssess S Grant winner of the US Civil War. One of my personal favorite generals of that war and in general (no pun intended there). His rep has been beat up, usually due to his drinking problem and his rather poor performance as a President. And of course, LOTS of people like to beat him down so they can build up Robert E. Lee of the Confederates.
Well, all that aside, the book. This book seems par for the course in that just because you are a great general you won't necessarily be a great writer. It starts rather slow and glosses over a great many things in Grant's early life. I was especially annoyed that he didn't write anything about his drinking issues and his business failures. I can understand why you would want to gloss over things like this, but one of the reasons I admire Grant was that he overcame some rather great adversity to quite literally get to the top. Much more than Lee did by my estimation. Much of this book focused on the Civil War, and was quite good. His insights into other generals was particularly interesting. He didn't write anything about after the end of the Civil War, so I got nothing on his Presidency (again a shame).
I would recommend that you either read this and then read something else immediately after about Grant that fills in the gaps to get a good feel for him, or vice versa. He sounds much like a general I would very much get along with and follow. He was always calm, and he conquored some major personal demons along the way. As I am very much a believer that someone who has failed and keeps at it is usually a better person for it, I can very much relate to Grant.
I also like his take on how he viewed the Civil War. He had a very high level outlook. Not just a battle (McCellan) or a campaign (Lee), but a broad a to b to c approach to win the war. He was probably one of the first American Generals to have a mental breakdown of warfare by Strategy/Operational/Tactical levels and how they interacted. Mass your men, attack where the enemy (weaker than you, outnumbered by you) has to fight, force him to defend everywhere or give up areas that will hurt him (the South had to fight for Atlanta, the Valley, Fort Fisher, and Richmond, but could NOT hold every area, so not enough set to win, but enough sent to get beat and weaken other areas). And Grant was a pretty good hand at maneuver warfare despite what critics think. You don't think so? Vicksburg. Still no? Chattanoga. Still no? Virginia 1864/65. Yeah, the last one was bloody. But old Bobby Lee never once held the initiative in that campaign, not once. He moved to Grant's tune, no one else ever did that.
Over all good book, but needs some filler to get all the details about a great man.
(PS: Thanks Jim and Maddie for the book).
This is the biography of US Grant, aka LT General Ulyssess S Grant winner of the US Civil War. One of my personal favorite generals of that war and in general (no pun intended there). His rep has been beat up, usually due to his drinking problem and his rather poor performance as a President. And of course, LOTS of people like to beat him down so they can build up Robert E. Lee of the Confederates.
Well, all that aside, the book. This book seems par for the course in that just because you are a great general you won't necessarily be a great writer. It starts rather slow and glosses over a great many things in Grant's early life. I was especially annoyed that he didn't write anything about his drinking issues and his business failures. I can understand why you would want to gloss over things like this, but one of the reasons I admire Grant was that he overcame some rather great adversity to quite literally get to the top. Much more than Lee did by my estimation. Much of this book focused on the Civil War, and was quite good. His insights into other generals was particularly interesting. He didn't write anything about after the end of the Civil War, so I got nothing on his Presidency (again a shame).
I would recommend that you either read this and then read something else immediately after about Grant that fills in the gaps to get a good feel for him, or vice versa. He sounds much like a general I would very much get along with and follow. He was always calm, and he conquored some major personal demons along the way. As I am very much a believer that someone who has failed and keeps at it is usually a better person for it, I can very much relate to Grant.
I also like his take on how he viewed the Civil War. He had a very high level outlook. Not just a battle (McCellan) or a campaign (Lee), but a broad a to b to c approach to win the war. He was probably one of the first American Generals to have a mental breakdown of warfare by Strategy/Operational/Tactical levels and how they interacted. Mass your men, attack where the enemy (weaker than you, outnumbered by you) has to fight, force him to defend everywhere or give up areas that will hurt him (the South had to fight for Atlanta, the Valley, Fort Fisher, and Richmond, but could NOT hold every area, so not enough set to win, but enough sent to get beat and weaken other areas). And Grant was a pretty good hand at maneuver warfare despite what critics think. You don't think so? Vicksburg. Still no? Chattanoga. Still no? Virginia 1864/65. Yeah, the last one was bloody. But old Bobby Lee never once held the initiative in that campaign, not once. He moved to Grant's tune, no one else ever did that.
Over all good book, but needs some filler to get all the details about a great man.
(PS: Thanks Jim and Maddie for the book).
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